Abstract-Internet worms, which spread in computer networks without human mediation, pose a severe threat to computer systems today. The rate of propagation of worms has been measured to be extremely high and they can infect a large fraction of their potential hosts in a short time. We study two different methods of patch dissemination to combat the spread of worms. We first show that using a fixed number of patch servers performs inadequately against Internet worms. We then show that by exploiting the exponential data dissemination capability of P2P systems, the spread of worms can be halted effectively. We compare the two methods by using fluid models to compute two quantities of interest: the time taken to effectively combat the progress of the worm, and the maximum number of infected hosts. We validate our models using simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE ADVENT of malicious mobile code has lead to a paradigm shift in Internet security applications. Earlier, computer viruses were inherently limited by the fact that human mediation was required for them to propagate, which also meant that human intervention was sufficient to contain them. However, with increased connectivity of computers and availability of information regarding vulnerabilities of operating systems and applications, there have been several instances of malicious code that propagate on their own. Such mobile malicious code are now called worms. Interest in worms has been fueled by headline-making attacks causing near cessation of Internet services, and the names of these worms -such as Code-Red, Slammer and Blaster-are now known to most Internet users.
By and large, research has focused on three areas -monitoring of worms, cutting down the rate of propagation (throttling) and delivering patches. In our model we have a network of susceptible hosts that subscribe to the services of a patch provider. This assumption is made on the basis of the fact that major OS creators automatically provide subscription to their patching services. We assume that the number of infected hosts when the patch is released is small as compared to the total number of hosts, which is in accord with the fact that so far most attacks have happened after a vulnerability has been disclosed. Also, worms which exploit previously unknown vulnerabilities (zero-day worms) have not been common [2] . Once the patch is released, the provider sends an update message (which is tiny as compared to the patch) to all hosts, which proceed to try and download the patch. Both susceptible and infected hosts may be patched, which is consistent with the fact that worms seen so far have not significantly injured their hosts during the time that they spread [3] , since killing their host would prevent them from spreading effectively.
Since worms have a stage in which their growth rate is exponential the time taken to infect a large fraction of hosts is likely to be small. In such a case it is very possible that a fixed number of patch servers would be unable to cope with the spread of the worm. It might then be advisable to combine throttling with a peer-to-peer (P2P) network that would be used for patch dissemination.
A. Related Work
A good deal of work has gone into measuring the spread of worms on the Internet [4] - [6] . The actual measurement is done by means of a network telescope. The idea here is to monitor a large fraction of the Internet address space [7] , [8] . Abnormal activity would register hits on the monitored space. In [9] , [10] , there are ideas on how a P2P network could be used for monitoring of abnormal behavior. Worm activity in an infected computer can be inferred by the fact that they tend to try to set up new connections at a high rate. By slowing down the rate at which new connections are established, worm applications can be retarded. This is the principle behind virus throttling [11] , [12] .
Using simple fluid models [13] , it is possible to study disease propagation using simple deterministic differential equations [14] , [15] . In the area of computer worms, initial work [16] - [18] largely focused on showing that the epidemiology model also applies to the spread of computer worms. Basic study of defense systems is also present in this work. The same kind of models are used in [19] to study different types of scanning that a worm could use and the effect it would have on the number of infected hosts. More recently, advanced models of worms, which include fine details such as nonuniform scanning rates due to saturation of access bandwidth, as well as ways to scale down the network for faster simulation that are accurate for certain worms like Slammer, have also been studied [20] - [22] . We use a simpler worm model, and our focus is on containment strategies. The use of fluid models to make predictions on the performance of worm containment schemes is presented in [2] , [23] . However, they do not consider the case when infected hosts can be patched. As observed in [3] , worms seen thus far have usually been fairly benign initially to the infected host so as to spread quickly, which means that the system operations are not significantly compromised.
The P2P idea for worm containment has been considered in earlier work. In [24] , a system in which different mutually distrusting firewalls try to detect the worm and spread alerts is considered. Analytical bounds on the performance are derived and numerical solutions are used to show that when the ratio of success of the alerts to infections is 4000 : 1, then the cooperative system can ensure that over 97% of the hosts can escape infection. In [25] , the authors consider several types of worm defense mechanisms, including patching with a fixed number of patch servers and different types of "patching worms" that duplicate the worm's behavior to disseminate patches. However, the improvement in performance due to the patching worms is not quantified in this work. In [2] , the authors conduct an extensive numerical comparison between the performance of patching worms and content filtering and conclude that the two methods have comparable effects only when content filtering covers 89% of the hosts. Along with the monitoring aspect, [10] also considers the P2P idea for propagating alerts generated by the peers themselves about possible worm infestations and perform detailed simulations on the fraction of hosts that such a system could save. [23] contains an analytical study of worm propagation and a cooperative P2P system for patching is considered. However, the P2P idea is not thoroughly investigated in this work.
B. Main Results
The objective of our study is to obtain a fundamental insight into the propagation of worms under active defense. Our focus is on obtaining analytical expressions for performance metrics. Such expressions can give qualitative insight into the network performance which are independent of network parameters. We focus on the orders of magnitude of parameters (such as worm propagation time, maximum number of infected hosts, and patching time) in the system. We express our results in terms of the total number of hosts in the system N (a large number), the virulence of the worm denoted by β (infections per unit time), which is the maximum rate at which the worm can spread, the ratio of the maximum rate of patch propagation to worm's virulence denoted by γ (dimensionless), the number of infected hosts when the patch is released I N (a function of N ), and the number of dedicated patch servers P N (a function of N ). For example, for a worm like Code-Red had a susceptible population of about 360, 000 hosts, and β = 1.8 infections per hour [17] . We present our main insights below.
• With a fixed number of patch servers, the maximum number of infected hosts is Θ(N ) and the time taken to disinfect the system is Θ((N − 2P N )/P N ). We show that in the case of a fixed number of patch servers, the time at which the infection starts to decay is Θ(ln N/ P N I N ) and that the number of infected hosts is Θ(N ) at this time. So a fixed number of patch servers has practically no effect on the spread of the worm until most of the hosts are infected. We also show that the time taken to wipe out the infection is Θ((N − 2P N )/P N ), so it takes a very long time for the system to be free of worms. The term γ plays almost no role in the results.
Also note that I N does not play a significant role -it does not help even if patching is started with the number of infections is low.
In the Code-Red like worm example, if we rely on a fixed number of patch servers, even if γ = 300, in roughly 7 hours we have an infected population of 200, 000. It takes about 25 hours to rid the system of the worm.
is the maximum number of infected hosts and Θ(ln N/P N + γ/(1 + γ) ln I N ) is the time taken to disinfect the system. We show that using P2P patch dissemination, the time at which the infection starts decreasing is
, and the time taken for the system to be worm free is
The value of γ can be increased by throttling the worm. For γ > 1, even small increases have a profound effect on P2P systemsfor instance, a γ of 2 in a P2P system shows a greatly superior performance to a γ of 300 in the fixed number of patch servers scheme. The effect of a delay in identifying the presence of the worm can be greatly reduced by increasing γ -the maximum number of infected hosts can be restricted to be close to the initial value I N . Also, if P N and I N are constants, the infection hits its peak and vanishes in Θ(ln N ) time. For the Code-Red like worm example, with γ being 2, the maximum number of infected hosts is of the order 1000 and the infection both hits its peak and is wiped out in about 5 hours -a paradigm shift from the fixed number of servers case!
C. Organization of the Paper
We begin in Section II by reviewing a differential equation model for the uniform scanning worm on the lines of the classical epidemic model. The model has been solved earlier, and using the solution we show the exponential spreading of the worm. The models and results in the rest of the paper are original and form the main contribution. In Sections III and IV we construct analytical models of the patching process. We create models for both the fixed number of servers and the P2P case and solve them. From the solutions we make predictions on the performance of the systems in dealing with worms. In Section V we provide simulations illustrating the characteristics of the patching process. Finally, we conclude in Section VI.
II. WORM PROPAGATION MODEL
We first review the simple epidemic model to understand worm propagation. Let the number of hosts in the network be N . We assume that all hosts are identical in operation and that until a host has been patched, it is vulnerable to a worm. Let the number of susceptible hosts at time t be denoted by S(t). Similarly, let the number of infected hosts at time t be denoted by I(t). Then we have that at any time t,
We assume that an infected host scans the address space of the network uniformly. This assumption follows from the fact that under our model all hosts are identical, and so are equally vulnerable to the worm. The fluid model is constructed as follows. Consider any one infected host. The probability of its choosing a susceptible host for infection is
N . Let the average time taken for infecting a susceptible host be The factor Q α is the maximum number of susceptible hosts that an infected host can infect per unit time. We define β Q α, which we call the virulence of the worm. In this paper we are primarily interested in the order relations of the system with N . So we take the unit of time as the expected time taken for an infection (1/β), which we call infection time units (ITU). Note that we may convert ITU to actual time by just multiplying by this factor. Then with time measured in ITU, the expected number of infected hosts in an ITU is
with λ being the rate of infection . Now, we assume that the infection process is Markovian, with time taken for infection to be exponentially distributed with transition rate equal to λ, then it can be shown [13] that as N → ∞, the fraction of infected hosts i(t)
where we have used (1). We represent the above showing explicit dependence on N (in differential form) as
where it is understood that N is large. The above is identical to the classical simple epidemic model [14] and has been used successfully in modeling the spread of infectious diseases. It has the closed form solution
The number of infected hosts grows exponentially initially and then levels off.
A. Spreading Time of the Worm and Patching Metrics
Given that worms so far either follow a spread-then-attack mode of operation or cause gradual damage, it would be interesting to know the order of time by which a large number of hosts are infected. We could possibly expect an attack (or significant damage) to occur at this time. It also gives a rough benchmark time at which we can compare the performance of different patching schemes. We use the following notation that defines a set of functions Θ(g(N )). We say
We also say that
Theorem 1: The time by which significant spread of the worm occurs is Θ(ln N ).
Proof: We would like to know when I(t) = κ N, where 0 < κ < 1. From (5), we directly have
For fixed κ and I N ∈ Θ(1), this time is Θ(ln N ).
The above result says that the worm spreads exponentially fast in any relevant time-frame. We now study two methods of patching assuming that the hosts are informed of the existence of the patch (short time since it is a simple update message). We use the following metrics to characterize any particular method of patching:
• When does the infection hit its peak, and what is the number of infected hosts at this time? • How long does it take to end the infection?
III. FIXED NUMBER OF PATCH SERVERS
Suppose the creator of the patch has a fixed number of patch servers. Both infected and susceptible hosts try to download patches from the patch servers. Let the number of patch servers be P N . In other words, the patch provider decides on some fixed number of patch servers based on the number of hosts in the system. Clearly, the provider cannot have P N ∈ Θ(N ), so we assume that P N ∈ o(N ), i.e., lim N →∞ P N /N = 0. In particular, if the number of patch servers is selected independently of N , then we just have P N ∈ Θ(1). Let each server be capable of disseminating γ patches in an ITU. In other words, the actual maximum rate at which each server can disburse patches is γ β patches per unit time. Then the rate at which the servers patches get disseminated is γP N patches per ITU, until the number of hosts to be patched is less that P N . After this point the rate is equal to the number of hosts remaining times γ. This finishing phase is irrelevant to our study, since the number of hosts patched during this time is just P N . Let the initial number of infected hosts be I N . This is the number of infected hosts when the patch is released. We assume that lim N →∞ I N /N = 0, i.e., in the order sense, the number of initially infected hosts is not comparable to the total number of hosts. We now construct the fluid differential equations corresponding to the system. Let number of patched hosts at time t be denoted by P (t). As before, the number of infected and susceptible hosts at this time are I(t) and S(t) respectively. Also, the rate at which the worm grows is S(t) I(t)/N . However, patching causes the number of infectious hosts in the network to decrease. Servers disburse patches to both infected as well as susceptible hosts. Then the mean number of infected hosts that obtain the patch in a unit time is (γ P N I(t))/(S(t) + I(t) ). In the fluid model, this quantity is the rate at which the infection decreases. Similarly, the rate at which susceptible population decreases is (γ P N S(t))/(S(t) + I(t) ). However, since the total number of hosts in the system is fixed, we can describe the system in terms of the infected and patched hosts alone as follows:
The differential equations are valid when number of patched hosts is no greater than N − P N , which is practically till all the hosts are patched if N >> P N . Note that if P N is O(N ), patching occurs almost immediately. We then have the following theorem: Theorem 2: (Proof in Appendix) For the fixed number of servers paradigm, we have that the number of infected hosts
where
We see how similar the expression for I(t) looks to (5). Essentially, the infection progresses unhindered for small t.
We expect that the effect of patching will not be felt till a fairly large number of hosts is infected. We are now ready to answer questions regarding its performance. We would first like to know when the number of infected hosts hits its maximum value.
Corollary For the fixed number of servers paradigm, the number of infected hosts is unimodal and starts decreasing when t = 0 for I N ∈ Θ(N ) and t = 2 ln
This also implies that t ∈ Θ(ln N ) for P N , I N ∈ Θ(1).
Proof:
To find out when the number of infected hosts starts decreasing, we need to find the time when d I dt ≤ 0. In order to do this we differentiate (11) and obtain
Setting d I
dt ≤ 0, substituting the value of C, and rearranging, we get
We observe that for I N ∈ Θ(N ), all hosts are initially infected and patching starts to bring down the number of infected hosts immediately. Also for I N , P N ∈ o(N ) and
Recall that in the system without patching, the time taken for infection of a significant population is Θ(ln N ). If P and I N are constant, the effect of patching is felt at exactly this time frame. It also shows increasing the patching rate γP N has little effect unless it is comparable to N (note that γ does not scale with N ). So even if the patch servers work very fast as compared to the virus, there would be no major consequence on the time at which the infection decreases. We next consider the question of how many hosts are infected at this time. We consider the non-trivial case of I N ∈ o(N ). Because the graph is unimodal, this is also the time at which the maximum number of hosts is infected.
Corollary For the fixed number of servers paradigm, the number of infected hosts is Θ(N ) for t ∈ Θ ln
. This is also the maximum number of infected hosts over all time.
Proof: Consider (11). For t ∈ Θ ln
) , the number of infected hosts is Θ(N ) as long as
, which is true by assumption.
The above result implies that a fixed number of patch servers is simply unable to cope with the spread of a well designed worm! Even if the patch is released when the number of infected hosts is small, there is little effect. Thus, quick worm detection is not very useful. In an unpatched system, the worm spreads to Θ(N ) hosts in Θ(ln N ) time. Thus, as far as the worm is concerned, a system with a fixed number of patch servers behaves as if practically no patching were occurring up to Θ ln
time. A worm which timed its attack at Θ(ln N ) time would be unstoppable. The next question is that of when the infection actually dies down, i.e., how long will it take for the number of infected hosts to come down to Θ(1)?
Corollary For the fixed number of servers paradigm, the time taken for the number of infected hosts to decrease to
, we have that lim N →∞ I(t) = P N ∈ Θ(1). Hence the proof.
Thus, the infection is contained well after the attack takes place. We conclude that patching with a fixed number of servers is a futile activity. Clearly, we don't just need a patch that kills the worm on contact, but also an efficient distribution mechanism that can deal with the worm by creating new servers -a P2P system.
IV. PEER-TO-PEER PATCH DISSEMINATION
We have just seen that the fixed number of patch servers scheme performs extremely badly in disseminating patches. Perhaps a P2P patch dissemination might be able to match the worm in its ability to proliferate? In such a scheme, a patch received from a peer would have to checked with respect to a hash (sent with the update message, for instance) to ensure security of patches. Such a method of verification is quite common in many P2P systems; see, for example, BitTorrent [26] . The update message should be very small as compared to the patch itself, so that the update does not impose a significant overhead. In the proposed scheme, hosts use a pull mechanism to obtain the patch, i.e., they contact hosts at random and ask them if they have the patch. If the patch is available, it is downloaded, verified, and installed. As before, let the number of hosts that initially possess the patch be P N and the initial number of infected hosts be I N , both of which are sub-linear in N . Let each host be capable of disseminating a maximum of γ patches in an ITU. The rate of patch dissemination looks very similar to the rate of worm dissemination that we saw in (4) and is given by γ N (S(t) + I(t)) P (t). Also, while the rate at which the worm increases is still 1 N S(t) I(t), it now decreases at the rate at which infected hosts are patched, which is just γ N I(t) P (t). Then we have the following description:
Our problem is now to solve the above system of equations and answer questions regarding the performance of the scheme. Theorem 3: (Proof in Appendix) For the P2P system, the number of infected hosts at time t is
where C = 1/I N for large N. It is trivial to see that if I N ∈ Θ(N ), then the time at which the infection starts decreasing is 0. Otherwise, we have:
Corollary For the P2P paradigm, the number of infected hosts is unimodal and decreases for t ≥ Proof: As before, the proof is obtained by differentiation.
which means that we need to find the time at which V (t) starts increasing. Taking the expression for I(t) from (15) and using it to set
Since the first term is positive, and P N N is small compared to 1, a sufficient condition for large N is
Note that the first term in (16) The result says that even in the P2P case, with a constant initial number of patch servers it would take Θ(ln N ) time for the infection to start decreasing. It also says that the time at which the number of infected hosts starts decreasing is unaffected by the initial number of infected hosts (as long as it is not Θ(N )), unlike the fixed server case.
The number of infected hosts at this time (which is also the maximum) ought to be much lower than in the fixed servers case since far more hosts have been patched in this time. We show that this is indeed true in the following result:
Corollary For the P2P paradigm, the maximum number of infected hosts is
Proof: The proof follows directly by substituting t = 
For γ ≤ 1, we get from (15) that I max ∈ Θ(N ). Hence the proof. The above result shows that even a P2P system has limited effect in Θ(ln N ) time if the patching constant γ ≤ 1. This seems intuitively correct -since the virulence β of the worm has been normalized to 1, only if γ > 1 will we observe significant reduction in the maximum number of infected hosts. Also observe that quick detection to reduce I N is very useful and the best that can be done is to restrict the maximum number of infected hosts to I N by increased throttling. The final question is that of how long it takes for the number of infected hosts to become small.
Corollary
For the P2P method of patching, the time taken for the number of infected hosts to decrease to Θ(1) is t = 
V. SIMULATIONS
We use simulations as illustrative examples to highlight the nature of the analytical results shown above. We consider a Code-Red v2 type worm with a virulence β = 1.8 infections per hour [17] and a susceptible population of 360, 000 hosts (obtained from [4] ). While other worms have infected the Internet since Code-Red v2, we have used Code-Red to verify our model due to the availability of extensive data on this worm. However, our results not specific to Code-Red since the derivations in the earlier sections do not use specific features of any particular worm. Our simulations were performed by using Simulink to simulate the fluid differential equations.
We first consider the system with a fixed number of patch servers, and the results are shown in Figure 1 . We use a patching rate γP N of 7, 800 per ITU. We assume that P N = 25 and I N = 25. From Corollary III we expect the time at which the infection hits its peak is t = 2 ln
ITU, i.e., about 7.5 hours, which matches fairly well with the graph. We also expect from Corollary III that the maximum number of infected hosts would be of order 10
5 , while the graph shows this value as about 2.3 × 10 5 . Finally, we expect from Corollary III that the infection is wiped out in
ITU, which is about 25 hours. We next perform experiments on the P2P system. First we take γ = 1, P N = 10 and I N = 25. The results are shown in Figure 2 . We make use of the Corollaries IV, IV and IV to find the expected numerical values. The expected time at which the infection starts reducing is 5.8 hours, which matches well with the graph. The number of infected hosts ought to be of the order 10 5 at this time, and the graph shows a value of 1.1 × 10 5 . Finally, the infection ought to end in about 11.6 hours, which matches quite well with the simulation (the tail is difficult to see in the figure as the peak is quite high). Notice that even with γ = 1 the P2P system takes about half the time to wipe out the infection as the fixed server scheme.
We now increase γ to 2 (and other parameters as before) in the P2P case. The results appear in Figure 3 . The time at which we expect the infection to start decaying is 2.7 hours, which is approximately what we see in the graph. The number of hosts infected at this time should be of order 10 3 , which compares with 1.8 × 10
3 that we see in the graph. Notice that both the time at which decay begins as well as the maximum number of infected hosts has shrunk sharply. The effect becomes more and more pronounced as γ is increased. Finally, we expect that the infection is over in 4.4 hours, which is what we see in the graph.
The simulations confirm our analytical results that indicated that P2P patching is superior compared to a fixed number of patch servers due to the following reasons: much lower number of infections and a much smaller time in which the infection is contained.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have sought to make a convincing case for the use of P2P networks for tackling Internet worms. We studied the effects of many parameters in the systems such as the patching rate, throttling, initial number of infected hosts and number of patch servers. We first studied the classical epidemic fluid model in order to understand the time scales of events. Using analysis and simulations, we then showed that a fixed number of patch servers is incapable of handling an epidemic. We also showed that a P2P system is far better suited to handle worm outbreaks, both in terms off the maximum number of infected hosts, as well as the time taken to wipe out the infection. It is also able to make use of throttling to combat a delay in identifying the presence of the worm.
APPENDIX: PROOFS OF MAIN THEOREMS A. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: From (8) by simple integration, with the initial condition P (0) = P N , we have
So the time at which the number of patched hosts is N − P N is t = 1 γP N N − 2P N . Now, consider the infection process. From (9) and (10) we have
Rearranging the above, we have the following second order Bernoulli differential equation
The solution to (18) is of the form
where C is a constant and
Here we have used the expression for P (t) from (17) . We now need to evaluate 1 N J(t) dt. This is accomplished by simple integration using the expression for J(t) from (20) as follows:
Making the substitution q = t −
2N
, and integrating we obtain 1 N J(t) dt = e q dq
Thus, (19) , (20) and (21) yield the final answer
Note that C = (N − P N − I N )/I N , as seen by plugging in t = 0. Noting that I(t) = 1/V (t), we have the proof.
B. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: The proof technique is similar to the one used earlier. We first solve for P (t) using (12) and (14) which is known to have the solution (of the same form as (5))
We then use (13) and (14) to obtain
+ γ)P (t)) I(t)
Rearranging, we have the following second order Bernoulli differential equation
We convert the above into a first order differential equation by substituting V (t) = 1 I(t) and obtain
As before, the above equation has a closed form solution given by
where C is a constant and 
Here we have used the expression for P (t) from (23) . Now, in order to obtain the closed form solution, we also require 
Then using (25) , (26) and (27), and simplifying we obtain V (t) = Note that C = 1/I N ∈ Θ(1) for large N , as seen by plugging in t = 0. Finally using the fact that I(t) = 1/V (t) (by definition) we have the proof.
